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I. INTRODUCTION

Public confidence in the judicial system requires economical administration of justice, consistency in decision-making, and finality of
judgments. These basic principles require a neutral forum where parties can fairly and expeditiously litigate their claims. To guard
against undermining public confidence in the courts, the common law
doctrines of res judicata,' law of the case,' and stare decisis 3 help
1.

The principle of res judicata fosters reliance on judicial action and tends to eliminate

vexation and expense to parties, wasted usage of judicial machinery, and the possibility of inconsistent results. Thomas v. Consolidated Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69, 77 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1004 (1967).
2. The law of the case doctrine is a restriction imposed by courts on themselves and generally operates to preclude re-examination of issues decided on appeal, either by a district court
on remand or by an appellate court itself upon subsequent appeal. Conway v. Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, 644 F.2d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court stated that
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guarantee consistency and finality of judicial rulings by limiting repe4
titious, time consuming hearings of matters once decided.
Although litigants should not manipulate the judicial process to
harass adverse parties or avoid fair and speedy resolution of disputes,
common law protections do not prevent all opprobrious use of judicial resources. Public disenchantment and judicial frustration with
expensive and unduly vexatious law suits have spurred increased efforts to curb abusive litigation.5 Federal and state legislation provide
specific sanctions against abusing the discovery process, 6 needlessly
protracting litigation,' and prosecuting frivolous claims.8
the bases for stare decisis are:
[T]he desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to
enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate
every relevant proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining public faith in
the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.
Id. at 403.
4. See, e.g., Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1965). The court stated that the
doctrines of res judicata/collateral estoppel, stare decisis, and law of the case are "adhered to
by this court and courts of other jurisdictions in order to lend stability to judicial decisions and
the jurisprudence of the state, as well as to avoid 'piecemeal' appeals and to bring litigation to
an end as expeditiously as possible." Id. at 3.
5. Numerous articles and commentaries have appeared describing misuse of the judicial
process, particularly discovery abuse. See, e.g., Frank, Will sanctions reduce discovery disputes?, CALIF. LAw., June 1983 at 32; Freeland & Freeland, Bad Faith Litigation:A Practical
Analysis, 53 Mss. L.J. 237 (1983); Fruin, When Lawyers Bend the Court Out of Shape, 21
JUDGE J. 14 (1982); Marcus, Reducing court costs and delay: the potential impact of the Proposed Amendments to the federal rules of civil procedure, 66 JUDIcATURE 363 (1983); Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse: Sanctions under the FederalRules of Civil Procedureand the
California Code of Civil Procedure, 21 SANTA CLARA L. R.v. 567 (1981).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (establishing sanctions for failure to make or cooperate in
discovery, including attorney's fees and contempt of court, striking pleadings and dismissal
where there is failure to comply with a court order); FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.380 (establishing sanctions for failure to obey discovery orders, including dismissal, default judgment, and attorney's
fees and expenses).
7. See, e.g., Lopez v. Arkansas Cty. Indep. School Dist., 570 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978) (FED.
R. Crv. P. 41(b) codifies the court's inherent power to dismiss a cause with prejudice for failure
to prosecute whenever needed to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases); Zavala
Santiago v. Gonzalez Rivera, 553 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1977) (power to dismiss a case with
prejudice for want of prosecution is necessary to prevent undue delays in the disposition of
pending cases, docket congestion and the possibility of harassment of a defendant); American
Eastern Corp. v. Henry Blanton, Inc., 382 So. 2d 863 (Fla.2d D.C.A. 1980) (purpose of failure
to prosecute rule, FLA.R. Crv. P. 1.420(e), is to expedite litigation and to keep court dockets as
current as possible by imposing sanction of dismissal).
8. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (providing that any attorney or other person who
engages in unreasonable and vexatious litigation may be personally required to satisfy excess
costs, expenses and attorneys' fees); FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1978) (providing for award of attorney's fees to prevailing party in civil action based on spurious claim). The Florida Supreme
Court has stated, "[t]he purpose of section 57.105 is to discourage baseless claims, stonewall
defenses and sham appeals in civil litigation by placing a price tag through attorney's fees
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Many jurisdictions have also restricted plaintiffs' right to voluntary dismissal without prejudice to reduce its use as a mechanism of
abusive litigation." Courts sometimes find voluntary dismissal justifiable when used to avoid technical failures of proof' 0 or cure certain
untimely motions.1 1 Limiting plaintiffs' right to self-terminate a lawsuit and later relitigate is especially desirable, however, where a
plaintiff uses the dismissal procedure to evade an unfavorable evidentiary ruling,12 circumvent an interlocutory order, 3 seek a more
favorable forum, 1 4 or escape an impending adverse verdict. 5 Otherwise, a plaintiff can strategically use the dismissal procedure to gain
an unfair advantage, while subjecting the defendant to multiple and
expensive law suits."8 Such a practice contravenes the public interest
in prompt termination of litigation, permits inconsistent rulings by
subsequent courts, and encourages improvident use of judicial
resources.
This note examines the current status of plaintiff's right to voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Florida's absolute right to voluntary
awards on losing parties who engage in these activities." Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
410 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1982).
9. Most jurisdictions now limit plaintiffs' ability to unilaterally dismiss without prejudice
to specified stages of litigation. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (before adverse party answers or files
motion for summary judgment); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1009 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (before
trial or hearing has begun); N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAW § 3217(a) (McKinney 1970) (before responsive
pleading or twenty days after service, whichever is earlier).
10. E.g., Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947) (upholding voluntary dismissal to avoid technical failure of proof where there was a meritorious claim).
11. E.g., Hoffman v. Alside, Inc., 596 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1979) (dismissal upheld to cure
untimely motion for trial).
12. E.g., Kolman v. Kolman, 58 F.R.D. 632 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (dismissal taken to secure
benefit of new rules of evidence in subsequent trial).
13. E.g., Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953) (dismissal and refiling in new forum sought to circumvent court's
denial of motion for preliminary injunction).
14. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 46 F.R.D. 12 (E.D. Ark. 1969)
(dismissal sought in Arkansas to refile in Georgia in attempt to gain benefit of different body of
substantive law).
15. E.g., Fears v. Lunsford, 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975) (dismissal taken after court announced directed verdict outside presence of jury).
16. McCann v. Bentley Stores Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1940). Commenting on
the evils of plaintiff's absolute right to voluntary dismissal prior to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a), the
court stated:
[I]t not infrequently happened.., that in a case.. . which had come to issue, perhaps
after disposition of preliminary motions, which had gone to trial, in the trial of which
plaintiff had introduced all his testimony, for the trial of which defendant had called
witnesses from great distances and incurred great expense, the plaintiff would dismiss,
just at the moment the court was about to direct a verdict for defendant. The next day
he might bring the same suit again. And the process might be repeated time after time.
It was an outrageous imposition not only on the defendant but also on the court.
Id. at 234.
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dismissal receives particular emphasis, with the primary focus on the
resulting prejudice to defendants, waste of judicial resources, and
potential flouting of judicial authority. The note then examines the
federal, New York, and Wisconsin rules by analyzing the standards
applied in evaluating dismissals and imposing conditions thereon.
Based on criteria used in these jurisdictions, the note suggests
amending the Florida rule to provide for judicial balancing of competing interests in evaluating voluntary dismissal motions.
II.

FLORIDA - PLAINTIFF'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY DISMIssAL

A. History and Development of Voluntary Dismissal
Historically, voluntary dismissal, known as nonsuit at common
law, 17 granted plaintiffs an absolute right to dismiss without
prejudice anytime prior to the verdict.1 ' Because inadequate transportation and communication made it difficult for some plaintiffs to
secure the presence of a necessary witness or otherwise appear ready
for trial, the broad implementation of nonsuit was justifiable."9 Additionally, overly technical filing procedures and pleading requirements
often necessitated nonsuits to preserve meritorious claims.2 0 The unlimited right to nonsuit, however, created an unjust advantage for the
plaintiff; discerning a suit progressing poorly, a plaintiff could discontinue the action and later relitigate under more favorable
conditions.2"
Florida statutorily recognized common law nonsuit in 1828, 2 but
17. At early common law nonsuit was the dismissal of plaintiff's case without adjudication, except for imposition of costs, ordered when plaintiff failed to appear in court upon demand. Although it ended that particular action, it did not preclude further actions on the original claim. See Head, The History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q 20 (1920) (later
nonsuit and voluntary dismissal were treated as synonymous terms); Note, The Right of a
Plaintiffto Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to Dismiss His Action Without Prejudice,37 VA. L.

Rav. 969 (1951). See also Continental Aviation Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 183 So.
2d 200 (Fla. 1966) (where the Florida Supreme Court held mistaken reference to nonsuit rather

than voluntary dismissal was not fatal error).
18. See Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 93 (1924) (some early English cases
even allowed nonsuit after verdict when plaintiff was dissatisfied with damages awarded). See
Head, supra note 17, at 23-24.
19. See generally Head, supra note 17.
20. See Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 165 U.S. 86 (1924). See also Note, Absolute
Dismissal Under Federal Rule 41(a): The DisappearingRight of Voluntary Nonsuit, 63 YMXL
L.J. 738, 738 (1954).
21. McCann v. Bentley Stores Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1940) (noting plaintiff
could bring successive lawsuits on the same claim through improper use of the common law
nonsuit). See supra note 16; see generally Head, supra note 17.

22. An Act Concerning Judicial Proceedings, Acts of the Legislative Council Act of Nov.
23, 1828, § 69 FLORIDA TEamuoRus SESSION LAws.
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required a plaintiff to exercise the right before the jury retired.2" The
courts classified nonsuits as voluntary or involuntary depending upon
the existing circumstances. 24 Voluntary nonsuits were granted whenever the plaintiff was unprepared to continue prosecuting a claim or
the defendant surprised the plaintiff in court.2 5 Involuntary nonsuits
were granted whenever a plaintiff was compelled to dismiss because
an impending adverse ruling would preclude recovery.2 6
Recognizing the tremendous advantage given plaintiffs by an absolute right to nonsuit, the courts began qualifying its use.2 7 For example, while a court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment after
nonsuit, it could vacate a nonsuit and reinstate the action during the
same term of court.2 8 This procedure was within the court's inherent
power to modify or vacate its own judgment.2 9
The Florida Supreme Court also disallowed involuntary nonsuits
where recovery would be automatically precluded by the statute of
limitations.3 0 Only involuntary nonsuits taken because a plaintiff
failed to prove the asserted cause of action were allowed.3 ' Realizing
nonsuit often prejudiced the defendant, one appeal court denied nonsuit where the defendant had gained a substantial right to have his
cause determined.3 2 Eventually, the supreme court ruled that an involuntary nonsuit equivalent to a judgment on the merits barred any
subsequent suit on the same cause of action.33 A voluntary nonsuit,
on the other hand, still allowed a plaintiff to bring successive law
suits on the original cause of action.3 4
In 1954 Florida adopted a restrictive voluntary dismissal rule
23. See J. Schnarr & Co., v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 117 Fla. 258, 159 So. 39
(1934) (plaintiff granted nonsuit after court announced directed verdict for defendant, but
before jury retired). Some early English cases permitted plaintiff to nonsuit after verdict when
damages were unsatisfactory. See Head, supra note 17, at 23-24.
24. For an indepth history of nonsuit in Florida, see Note, Florida's Unique Dismissal The Non-Suit, 13 U. FLA. L. REr. 105 (1960).
25. Id. at 106.
26. See Crews v. Woods, 59 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1952); Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 139
Fla. 328, 190 So. 533 (1939); Spiker v. Hester, 101 Fla. 288, 289, 235 So. 502, 502 (1931). Once
plaintiff suffered a nonsuit, the defendant was entitled to recover costs.
27. See generally Note, supra note 24.
28. State ex rel. Croker v. Chillingworth, 106 Fla. 323, 327, 143 So. 346, 347 (1932).
29. Id.
30. Crews v. Woods, 59 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1952) (court denied nonsuit motion made to avoid
summary judgment based on statute of limitations defense). A plaintiff barred by the statute of
limitations in one jurisdiction might dismiss and bring suit in another forum having jurisdiction
in which the statute had not yet run.
31. Id.
32. Lynch v. Linden, 115 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1959).
33. J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 118 Fla. 258, 268, 159 So. 39, 43
(1934).
34. Id.
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which limited a plaintiff to only one dismissal without prejudice.35
The rule further provided a plaintiff the right of voluntary dismissal
only before the defendant answered or served a motion for summary
judgment.3 An additional clause, however, preserved the statutory
right to nonsuit 5 7 The result was a confusing and contradictory prac-

tice which allowed a plaintiff to discontinue an action without
prejudice, even during advanced stages of litigation, provided the motion was filed as a nonsuit rather than a voluntary dismissal. 8
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1962 to
exclude the savings clause which had served to legitimize the nonsuit.39 Confusion remained over the scope of plaintiffs' right to discontinue an action without prejudice, however, until the Florida Supreme Court explicitly held that the voluntary dismissal rule
abolished the nonsuit in Florida.4 ° Initially, Florida's dismissal rule
was identical to the federal rule41 which limits unfettered voluntary
dismissal to pre-answer stages of litigation. The Florida Supreme
Court soon amended the rule, however, to expand plaintiffs' right to
voluntary dismissal until the jury retires. 42 Thus, although Florida
abolished the nonsuit, plaintiffs' new procedural right to voluntary
dismissal was substantially similar in breadth.48
35. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a)(1) (1954) originally provided:
Subject to the provisions hereof, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment or decree, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dimissal signed by all the parties who have appeared
in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal shall be without prejudice, except that a dismissal shall operate as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of this
State an action based on or including the same claim.

Id.
36. Id.
37. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.35(2)(b) (1954) contained a clause stating, "nothing stated herein
shall preclude a non-suit from being taken pursuant to any applicable statute." Id.
38. See generally Note, supra note 24.
39. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(2)(b) (1962). No explanation was given for deleting the clause
preserving nonsuits.
40. Crews v. Dobson, 177 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965). The court relied on section 3, article V of
the Florida Constitution vesting sole authority to adopt rules of civil probedure in the supreme
court in ruling FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.135 had abolished the nonsuit. Id. at 204.
41. FaD. R. Civ. P. 41(a). See infra note 116 for complete text of the rule.
42. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a)(1) (1966).
43. The major qualification of.voluntary dismissal over nonsuit, however, is that more
than one voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. See infra note 47.
Given the advantages and potential abuses of the rule, however, the absolute right to even one
free dismissal is unwarranted. See infra text accompanying notes 44-91.
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B. Current Scope of Plaintiff's Right to Voluntary Dismissal
Despite the modern trend restricting plaintiff's right to voluntary
dismissal without prejudice, Florida has expanded the scope of its
dismissal procedure. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420 provides
plaintiff one voluntary dismissal without prejudice before the jury retires or before submission of the case to the court in a nonjury trial."
Commencement of a summary judgment hearing suspends a plaintiff's right to dismissal, but a plaintiff may subsequently dismiss if
summary judgment is denied.4 5 Plaintiff need only serve a notice of
dismissal to terminate litigation.4 Thus, absent a successful summary judgment motion, the rule gives plaintiff the advantage of dismissing suit during advanced stages of trial, without barring a second
suit based on the original cause of action.
The extent of plaintiffs' power to once dismiss without prejudice
was firmly established in Fears v. Lunford,47 where a married couple
brought suit to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. While the jury was in recess, the court announced a directed
verdict for the defendant on the wife's loss of consortium claim. 48 Desiring to preserve her claim for future litigation, the wife immediately
gave notice of voluntary dismissal. The trial court approved the dismissal and therefore submitted only the husband's injury claim to
the jury.4 9
44.

FLA. R.

Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1) now provides:

Except in actions wherein property has been seized or is in the custody of the court, an
action may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of court (i) by serving or during trial,
by stating on the record, a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for
summary judgment, or if none is served or if such motion is denied, before retirement of
the jury in a case tried before a jury or before submission of a nonjury case to the court
for decision, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice or stipulation, the dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon
the merits when served by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an action
based on or including the same claim. If a lis pendens has been filed in the action, a
notice or stipulation of dismissal under this paragraph shall be recorded and cancels the
lis pendens without the necessity of an order of court.

Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. When a counterclaim is pending, however, plaintiff may not dismiss without
prejudice except by court order. In such cases the court will dismiss without prejudice but may
impose appropriate conditions providing the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(2). Few instances can be imagined on which a valid counterclaim cannot survive as an independent action.
47. 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975).
48. Id. at 579.

49. Id.
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When the plaintiff5 ° later filed a new loss of consortium claim, the
court sustained the defendant's res judicata defense based on the
previous court's directed verdict.51 On appeal, the First District
Court of Appeal affirmed,52 narrowly interpreting the dismissal rule
to prevent plaintiff.from defeating justice and prolonging litigation.5"
The Florida Supreme Court reversed,54 granting plaintiff an absolute
right to voluntary dismissal without prejudice.55 Emphasizing that
plaintiff's dismissal was effective independent of the trial court's approval, the supreme court ruled that voluntary dismissal taken after
a directed verdict announced outside the jury's presence does not
constitute res judicata.56
To the dissent, the majority opinion authorized relitigation of an
issue already tried and found legally insufficient. 7 Reasoning that the
dismissal rule contemplates voluntary dismissals only before the jury
retires or the judge rules, the dissent argued a directed verdict should
preclude voluntary dismissal. 58 Because a directed verdict is a formal
adjudication, the dissent concluded that any subsequent voluntary
dismissal request was not59authorized by the language of Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.420.
The Fears court's only rationale for granting plaintiff an absolute
right to voluntary dismissal was that a literal application of Rule
1.420 required such a result.60 This limited reasoning is unsatisfactory because the court itself is responsible for adopting rules of practice and procedure. 61 Additionally, many states with facially broad
dismissal rules like Florida's have not found it necessary to grant
plaintiff an absolute right to voluntary dismissal. Missouri's dismissal
rule,62 for example, provides that a plaintiff shall be allowed to dis50. For the sake of clarity, the terms plaintiff and defendant will be used throughout this
note regardless of the status of the parties on appeal.
51. Fears v. Lunsford, 295 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 325.
54. Fears, 314 So. 2d at 578.
55. Id. at 579.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 580.
58. Id. While recognizing that the rule makes no mention of directed verdicts, the dissent
found no distinction between a summary judgment hearing, submission of a nonjury case to the
court for decision, and granting a directed verdict. Id.
59. Id. The dissent also cited the Author's Comments accompanying the rule, which
stated a strong showing by plaintiff is required to support voluntary dismissal after defendant
has moved for a directed verdict. Id. at 580 n.2.
60. Id. at 579.
61. FI& CONST., art. V, § 3 (1968). The relevant portion states: "The practice and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court." Id.
62. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.130 (Vernon 1952).
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miss his action without -prejudice anytime before submission of the
case for decision. 3 The Missouri Supreme Court, however, has held
that Missouri's dismissal rule may not be properly exercised where
defendant will lose some right of defense or where plaintiff will gain
an undue advantage.6 4
By granting an absolute right to voluntary dismissal without
prejudice, the Fears court provided plaintiffs a procedural device to
escape unfavorable rulings or to avoid impending adverse verdicts.
There is no protection against any undue prejudice defendants may
suffer or the attendant waste of judicial resources caused by duplicative litigation. 5 Empowering plaintiffs with unilateral authority to
block action favorable to defendants is an unfair advantage which
contradicts the public interest in finality of judicial rulings, consistency in decision-making, and economical administration of justice.
One consequence of Florida's absolute right to voluntary dismissal
is the increased likelihood of forum shopping, since the choice of forum rests with the plaintiff when venue is proper in more than one
county."6 Thus, a plaintiff who becomes dissatisfied with his choice of
forum can voluntarily dismiss suit and start anew in a more favorable
forum. This tactic was approved in Houchins v. Florida East Coast
Railway,7 where the court of appeal ruled that the plaintiffs initial
choice of forum posed no barrier to voluntary dismissal and refiling
in another county. 8 Presumably, the same result would hold where
multiple states have jurisdiction and a plaintiff wishes to gain the
advantage of a different body of substantive law. 9 Such a maneuver
could deprive a defendant of a legally valid defense not available in
the alternative forum.70
The ability to dismiss suit without prejudice also permits plaintiffs to flout interlocutory judicial orders. In Ambassador Insurance
63. The statute states in part: "A plaintiff shall be allowed to dismiss his action without
prejudice at any time before the same is finally submitted to the jury, or to the court sitting as
a jury, or to the court, and not afterward." Id. § 510.130(1).
64. Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 451 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Mo. 1970). Accord Stubblefield v.
Seals, 485 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
65. See Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978).
66. Mann v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 300 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1974).
67. 388 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980).
68. Id. at 1291.
69. Federal courts have refused to allow plaintiffs to engage in such a practice. See Hohngren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856, 857 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding trial court's
refusal to allow plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss negligence action in North Dakota for sole purpose of bringing suit in strict liability in Nebraska).
70. This result would not have been allowed under the former nonsuit rule, however, if
plaintiff took an involuntary nonsuit because his claim was completely barred under Florida
law. Crews v. Woods, 59 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1952) (court refused to permit nonsuit sought to avoid

summary judgment based on running of statute of limitations).
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Co. v. Highlands General Hospital, 1 the Second District Court of
Appeal reversed the trial court's order striking the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal. The plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal two
years after the trial court ordered it to either register as a foreign
corporation with the Florida Department of State or forfeit its
claim. 72 Consistent with its order, the trial court subsequently dismissed the suit, but granted the plaintiff sixty days to cure the jurisdictional defect. The plaintiff ignored the trial court's order and filed
suit in federal court.
Faced with the prospect that the federal suit was barred by the
state court's dismissal, plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal of the
state court proceeding.73 Ruling that the trial court's dismissal was
conditional and therefore an interlocutory order, the court of appeal
granted the plaintiff an absolute right to dismiss without prejudice. 7
The federal court relied on the court of appeal and found Florida's
absolute right to voluntary dismissal precluded application of collateral estoppel 'or res judicata to the state trial court's interlocutory
dismissal.7 5 The Ambassador case thus established additional prece-

dent for future plaintiffs to flout judicial authority by simply dismissing suit to avoid unfavorable rulings.
The Florida Supreme Court also provided precedent foreclosing
any discretionary judicial power to prevent unreasonable use of the
voluntary dismissal procedure. In Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service v. Vasta, the plaintiff sought reinstatement of her wrongful
death action after realizing her voluntary dismissal would bar refiling
because the statute of limitations had expired.7 6 Refusing to relieve
the plaintiff from the harsh consequences of her tactical error, the
supreme court ruled that voluntary dismissal immediately divested
the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court consequently lacked
authority to reinstate the mistakenly dismissed proceedings. The
court's opinion was heavily influenced by policy considerations which
require a plaintiff to accept the consequences of a careless dismissal
in exchange for the usual advantages which work to prejudice defendants and waste judicial resources.78 This holding diverges from the
71. 383 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
72. Id. at 255. FLA. STAT. § 607.354(1) (1983) precludes foreign corporations doing business in Florida from bringing a suit on a contract unless it was registered with the Department
of State.
73. 383 So. 2d at 255.
74. Id. at 255-56.
75. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Stiles, 628 F.2d 373, 373-75 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978). Plaintiff had not realized the statute of limitations had run
on her claim, thus barring her from refiling. Id.
77. 360 So. 2d at 69.
78. Id. The court candidly described the prejudicial results often accompanying voluntary
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practice under the former nonsuit rule which allowed a trial court to
reinstate a nonsuited claim as an exercise of inherent judicial
power.7"
Although Randle-Eastern involved an unusual situation in which
voluntary dismissal adversely affected the plaintiff, the court's ruling
ultimately permits plaintiffs to avoid sanctions for abusive litigation.
In Bevan v. D'Alessandros° the state filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's replevin action for failure to prosecute the claim."' Rather
than comply with requirements to show good cause for delay and appear for hearing on the motion, the plaintiff filed notice of voluntary
dismissal without prejudice.8 2 Disregarding the voluntary dismissal
motion, the trial court conducted the hearing ex parte and dismissed
the claim with prejudice for failure to prosecute. 3 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding plaintiff's voluntary dismissal
divested the trial court of jurisdiction to impose sanctions for failure
84
to prosecute.
A similar result occurred in Romar International,Inc. v. Rothman Chevrolet/Cadillac,Inc.,8 5 where plaintiff had noticed his opponent for deposition but failed to attend. Defendant moved for an
award of attorney's fees and expenses as sanctions against the plaintiff for abuse of discovery. 6 The plaintiff then took a voluntary dismissal, but the trial court nevertheless heard the motion and
awarded defendant costs and attorney's fees. 8 7 Citing Randle-Eastern, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reluctantly concluded that
voluntary dismissal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to impose
dismissal:
There is no recompense

. . .

for a defendant's inconvenience, his attorney's fees, or the

instability to his daily affairs which are caused by a plaintiff's self-aborted lawsuit. Nor
is there any recompense for the cost and inconvenience to the general public through the
plaintiff's precipitous or improvident use of judicial resources.

Id.
79. See State ex. rel. Croker v. Chillingworth, 106 Fla. 323, 327, 143 So. 346, 347 (1982).
80. 395 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 2(1 D.C.A. 1981).
81. Id. Section 1.420(e) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of
actions in which no record activity occurs for more than one year. A party must show good
cause in writing at least five days before hearing on motion to dismiss as to why the action
should remain pending. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.420(e).
82. 395 So. 2d at 1285.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1286. The court stated that "although we feel appellant has thwarted the intent
and purpose of the rule, his absolute right to the benefits of rule 1.420(a)(1) superseded his
responsibility to comply with rule 1.420(e)." Id.
85. 420 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982).
86. Id. at 347. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(g)(7) provides for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, as sanctions for falling to attend deposition.
87. 420 So. 2d at 347.
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sanctions for plaintiff's misprison 88
As the Bevan and Romar decisions demonstrate, plaintiffs can
utilize their absolute right to voluntary dismissal to circumvent sanctions designed to prevent other forms of abusive litigation. 89 Dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is necessary to help courts
better manage overcrowded dockets and protect defendants from the
expense and harassment of needlessly protracted ligitation. 90 Likewise, the risk of sanctions for discovery abuse helps insure fair and
expeditious law suits. 91 The absolute right to voluntary dismissal renders those remedial devices virtually ineffective against plaintiffs.
Such a result allows unscrupulous plaintiffs to harass defendants and
flout judicial authority while contravening the public interest in expeditious administration of justice.
C. Limited Safeguards for ProtectingDefendants and Preserving
JudicialIntegrity
Although Florida law provides limited safeguards against unwarranted abuse of the voluntary dismissal procedure, these protections
are generally inadequate. A viable, untapped source of protection for
judicial integrity is couched in the fraud on the court doctrine. In
Select Builders of Florida v. Wong, the plaintiff successfully persuaded the trial court to expunge a federal court injunction from
county public records to clear the title on plaintiff's condominium
development property. 2 Discovering that plaintiff may have obtained
equitable relief through fraud,9 3 the trial court vacated its expungement order, ordered plaintiff to place the parties and property in a
status quo, and required deposit of monies from plaintiff's sale of the
property.9 4 After the defendants moved for additional sanctions, the
plaintiff served notice of voluntary dismissal. The trial court then entered an order striking the voluntary dismissal and retaining jurisdiction over the cause. Affirming the trial court's action, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that an equity court has inherent power
to protect its integrity where a plaintiff obtains affirmative relief by
5
fraud.
Despite the opportunity to expand the application of the fraud on
88. Id. at 348.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
induced
94.
95.

See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.

See supra note 7.
See supra note 6.
367 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979).
Id. The court did not elaborate on the exact nature of the alleged fraud which had
it to expunge the federal court injunction. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
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the court doctrine, the Bevan and Romar courts failed to do so. The
Romar court cited Select Builders without comment.96 The plaintiff
in Bevan had not sought to avoid correction of fraudulently obtained
affirmative relief, leading the court to find the voluntary dismissal
did not rise to the level of fraud on the court.9 7 Yet, the Bevan and
Romar cases permit the use of voluntary dismissal to avoid sanctions
for other abusive litigation, thereby encouraging disrespect for judicial authority and misuse of procedural rights. In this sense, voluntary dismissal amounts to fraudulent use of the judicial process. The
federal courts have long held, for example, that a trial court has inherent authority to dismiss actions for lack of prosecution in order to
prevent undue delays and avoid docket congestion.98 Extension of
courts' inherent authority to strike abusive voluntary dismissals,9
however, appears unlikely in Florida absent the supreme court's reevaluation of the absoluteness of plaintiffs' right to dismiss without
prejudice.
Perhaps the greatest practical burden suffered by defendants
forced to endure the protracted litigation of a second suit caused by
voluntary dismissal is the expense of attorney's fees.' While the
Florida rule provides for assessment of costs,' 0 ' it is now well settled
that defendant's attorney's fees are not included. 102 Since an award
of attorney's fees is a matter of substantive law,'03 the courts are
without power to compensate defendants for their attorney's services
absent specific legislative authorization. 04 Florida courts have so far
been able to award attorney's fees after a voluntary dismissal only in
condemnation

proceedings

05

and

under

the

mechanic's

lien

statute. 06
96. 420 So. 2d at 347.
97. Bevan v. D'Allesandro, 395 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1981). This was precisely
the reasoning given by the court for refusing to rule plaintiff had perpetrated a fraud on the

court. Id.
98. E.g., Kenney v. California Tanker Co., 381 F.2d 775 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
904 (1967).
99. Cf. Chapnick v. Hare, 394 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (court refused to allow

voluntary dismissal to divest it of jurisdiction after plaintiff had obtained temporary custody of
his child in divorce proceedings and then sought to avoid returning child to mother by dimissing his divorce action).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 163-71.
101. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d). Costs were also available under the common law nonsuit.
See Spiker v. Hester, 101 Fla. 286, 289, 135 So. 502, 502 (1931).
102. See Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1978). Accord
MacBain v. Bowling, 374 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979); Giachetti v. Johnson, 308 So. 2d
143, 144 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975).
103. Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982).
104. Id. at 504-05.
105. See City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1970).
106. See Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Conditioning, 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
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Recently the Florida legislature enacted a statute requiring courts
to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any civil action
where there is a complete absence of justiciable issues of law or
fact.10 7 The purpose of the statute is to discourage frivolous litigation
that wastes both judicial resources and time and money for prevailing
litigants.10 8 The Third District Court of Appeal originally indicated
that in proper circumstances the statute could be applied to plaintiffs
taking voluntary dismissals.1 0 9 Subsequently, however, the same
court indicated the frivolous claims statute does not contemplate discouraging parties from taking voluntary dismissals. 110 The court held
that a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal could not be used as evidence a
complaint was totally devoid of merit as required by the statute, because such dismissal does not go to the merits of the case.1 '
Under this holding, the court would be placed in the curious position of conducting a mini-trial on the merits in order to justify
awarding attorney's fees to defendants prejudiced by voluntary dismissal. Continued adherence to the holding that voluntary dismissal
divests the court of all jurisdiction in the case would, however, preclude even this unsatisfactory remedy. At most, the statute will prevent plaintiffs with frivolous claims from using the voluntary dismissal rule to harass defendants. In all likelihood, only the most
unscrupulous plaintiffs take advantage of the dismissal rule solely for
harassment purposes. Most plaintiffs probably make tactical use of
the rule precisely because their claims are not so tenuous as to preclude more favorable resolution in a second suit before a different
1976).
107.
108.
stated:

§ 57.105 (1978).
Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1982). The court

FLA. STAT.

The purpose of section 57.105 is to discourage baseless claims, stonewall defenses and
sham appeals in civil litigation by placing a price tag through attorney's fees awards on
losing parties who engage in these activities. Such frivolous litigation constitutes a reckless waste of judicial resources as well as the time and money of prevailing litigants.

Id.
109. MacBain v. Bowling, 374 So. 2d 75 (Fla. D.CA. 1979).
110. Executive Centers of Am. v. Durability Seating, 402 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d D.CA 1981). The court stated, "[hiolding a party liable for attorney's fees solely because they bring a
lawsuit and then take a voluntary dismissal would have the deleterious effect of discouraging
parties from seeking voluntary dismissals and is not what is contemplated by Section 57.105."
Id. A recent article, citing Florida as a synthesis of approaches followed in other states, claimed
FLA. STAT. § 57.105 was enacted to prevent plaintiffs from using voluntary dismissal to abuse
defendants' rights. Curiously, the authors cited no authority for their proposition. See Conklin
& Nachman, The Rights of Defendants Against Plaintiffs Who Take Nonsuits, 1981 ThiAL
LAw. GumE 237, 245. As the Executive Center holding makes clear, F.&STAT. § 57.105 was not
enacted to discourage voluntary dismissals. 402 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981).
111. Id.
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judge or jury. Therefore, this statute is unlikely to be successful in
discouraging unwarranted voluntary dismissals and curing defendants' economic injuries.
III.

THE FEDERAL RULE - INCREASED PROTECTION FOR DEFENDANTS

Beginning in 1938 the federal courts limited plaintiff to one nonsuit which could be taken only during the early stages of litigation.11 2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 currently provides plaintiff the
right to one voluntary dismissal without prejudice to a second suit, if
taken before the adverse party has answered or filed for summary
judgment. 113 A later request for voluntary dismissal is within the
courts discretion." 4 Most states have adopted some version of the
to situations where defenfederal rule"15 or limit voluntary dismissal
116
dants will not be unduly prejudiced.
The Federal Rule"17 was adopted in response to plaintiffs im112. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) originally provided that plaintiff was precluded from taking
voluntary dismissal without a court order once defendant filed an answer.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i). See infra note 115 for complete text of the rule. In 1946
the rule was amended to prevent voluntary dismissal after a motion for summary judgment.
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1946 Amendments to the Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule
41, state the reason for the change:
Omission of reference to a motion for summary judgment in the original rule was subject
A motion for summary judgment may be forthcoming prior to answer,
to criticism ....
and if well taken will eliminate the necessity for an answer. Since such a motion may
require even more research and preparation than the answer itself, there is good reason
why the service of the motion, like that of the answer, should prevent a voluntary dismissal without court approval.
Id. at 335.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See infra text accompanying notes 139-162.
115. E.g., IND. R. Civ. P. 41(a); MONT. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
116. E.g., Kerr v. Grant Foundries, Inc., 451 S.W.2d 26 (right to voluntary dismissal without prejudice before submission of case is qualified to extent that dismissal will not be granted
where defendant will lose some right of defense or plaintiff will gain some undue advantage).
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) provides:
Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof:
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e) of Rule 66,
and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the
adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs,
or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States
or of any state an action based on or including the same claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of
the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
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proper use of the nonsuit as an abusive litigation tactic.1 1 It improves on the Florida rule by restricting plaintiff's absolute right to
voluntary dismissal to early stages of litigation. Through the exercise
of judicial discretion, the court can deny an untimely motion for dismissal without prejudice which would otherwise result in substantial
legal bias to the defendant. 1 9 Additionally, where the court grants a
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, it can award attorney's fees 120 or impose
other curative conditions 12 1 to ameliorate any practical prejudice to
the defendant. Rule 41(a) is designed to protect defendants' right to
be free from unfair and vexatious litigation, while preserving the procedure of voluntary dismissal for plaintiffs. How successfully the federal rule fulfills these purposes and safeguards the public interest in
economical use of judicial resources is demonstrated by its application to particular factual situations.
A. Limiting Voluntary Dismissal to Early Stages of Litigation Some Remaining Inequities
The purpose of permitting plaintiff to unilaterally terminate a
lawsuit only in the early stages of litigation is to prevent arbitrary
dismissal after defendant has expended considerable time, effort and
expense in preparing his case.12 2 Initially, courts applying the rule attempted to effectuate this purpose by refusing to permit voluntary
dismissal without prejudice once the merits of the controversy were
raised.12 In Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanamid Co.,' 2 4 the
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice.
Id.
118. See Moore v. C.R. Anthony Co., 198 F.2d 607, 608 (10th Cir. 1952); Klar v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 14 F.R.D. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also McCann v. Bentley Stores
Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1940) (outlines abuses of nonsuit prior to Rule 41(a)).
119. See, e.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976).
120. Yoffe v. Keller Indus., 580 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979).
121. See LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 603 (5th'Cir. 1976). See also Eaddy v.
Little, 234 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (dismissal conditioned on plaintiffs production of certain documents); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 32 F.R.D. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (dismissal without
prejudice conditional on plaintiff covenanting not to sue defendants, where alternative dismissal with prejudice would otherwise have prejudiced plaintiff's related litigation); Stevenson v.
United States, 197 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (dismissal conditioned on plaintiff's making
available to defendant at second suit certain records, producing certain witnesses at trial, paying certain witnesses at trial, and paying one-half cost of defendant bringing in other
witnesses).
122. Armstrong v. Frostie Co., 453 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1971); Harvey Aluminum v.
American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
123. See Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953) (involving extensive hearing on request for preliminary injunction);
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Second Circuit Court of Appeal ruled the plaintiff was without power
to dismiss its suit because argument on its motion for preliminary
injunction had explored the merits of the case.' 25 Acknowledging that
the plaintiff attempted voluntary dismissal before the defendants
had answered or served motion for summary judgment, the court
noted that a literal application of Rule 41(a)(1) would defeat its essential purpose. 1 1 Defendants had spent considerable effort and expense to successfully defend the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, 12 and the plaintiff's avowed purpose in seeking dismissal
was to relocate to a forum more receptive to granting equitable
relief. 12 8

Subsequent federal cases have either rejected the Harvey rationale or limited the case to its facts in favor of a literal application of
the rule. 12 9 As a result, some plaintiffs have taken tactical advantage
of the rule during late stages in the proceedings where an unwary
defendant has not formally answered or served motion for summary
judgment. The predominant position is that the court has no discretion to deny voluntary dismissal or impose conditions thereon if it is
exercised within the prescribed limits. 30 In D.C. Electronics, Inc. v.
Nartron Corp.,'31 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal found Rule
41(a)(1) clear and unambiguous, permitting no judicial discretion to
prevent a unilateral dismissal prejudicial to the defendant.'3 2 Stating
that a defendant can protect itself from prejudice by quickly filing a
formal answer or summary judgment motion,' the court ruled the
plaintiff's voluntary dismissal valid even though the parties had enButler v. Denton, 150 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1945) (petition for intervention tendered justiciable
issues); Robertson v. Limestone Mfg. Co., 20 F.R.D. 365 (W.D.S.C. 1957) (argument of motion
for temporary restraining order).
124. 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
125. Id. at 107.
126. Id. at 108; cf. Tele-Views News Co. v. S.R.B. TV Pub. Co., 28 F.R.D. 303 (E.D. Pa.
1961) (holding motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
equivalent to motion for summary judgment).
127. 203 F.2d at 107. The hearing involved several days of argument and yielded a 420
page record. Id.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 599 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1979); D.C.
Elecs. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 1975).
130. See D.C. Elecs. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1975); Plains Growers v.
Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, 474 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1973); American Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 317
F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963); Detroit Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 88 F.R.D. 671 (E.D.
Mich. 1981). The courts do refuse, however, to allow plaintiffs to condition their dismissal on a
future judicial ruling or occurrence. Hyde Const. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968).
131. 511 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 298.
133. Id.
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tered a written stipulation extending the time for the defendant to
answer. Recognizing potential abuse of the rule, the court did note
that commentators have long urged all voluntary dismissals be subject to judicial discretion."'
Other federal courts have permitted a plaintiff to unilaterally dismiss a defendant severed from a multidefendant law suit in which
only a nonsevered defendant had answered;31 5 where a recalcatrant
plaintiff refused court ordered discovery and dismissed to circumvent
defendant's successful removal to federal court; 136 and where a plaintiff dismissed an action pending more than two years and the parties
had participated in filing a joint petition for removal, pretrial conferences, taking deposition, and exchanging letters.137 While the policy

of Rule 41(a)(1) is to protect defendants from undue prejudice by
proscribing arbitrary dismissals during late stages of the proceedings,
literal application of the rule's objective standard often compromises
defendants' interests. Amending the rule to allow the imposition of
conditions, such as attorney's fees, where a plaintiff's dismissal
thwarts the rule's intent, would better protect unwary defendants."3 "
This solution, however, would not prevent waste of judicial resources
caused by untimely dismissals. As the court recognized in D.C. Electronics, perhaps the best method of fulfilling the federal rule's purpose is to subject all voluntary dismissals to judicial discretion.
B. The Exercise of JudicialDiscretion in Evaluating Motions to
Dismiss
Federal Rule 41(a)(2) allows plaintiffs to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice after the defendant answers or serves a motion
for summary judgment, but only upon approval by the court. 3 9 The
purpose of this portion of the rule is to freely permit a plaintiff to
134. Id. See 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.02[3] (2d ed. 1982); Note, Federal Civil
Procedure:Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(1), 1962 DuKE L.J. 285 (1962); Note, Absolute Dismissal Under Federal Rule 41(a): The DisappearingRight of Voluntary Nonsuit, 63
YALE L.J. 738 (1954). Cf. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 506 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1978)
(endorsing the subjective standard embodied in the rule, the court found undesirable the task
of subjectively determining when each case has advanced far enough to prejudice the defendant
and defeat the purposes of the rule. The court suggested that any modifications of the rule
should be left to Congress and the Supreme Court).
135. Sheldon v. Amperex Elec. Corp., 449 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1971).
136. Plains Growers, Inc. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1973).
137. Detroit Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 88 F.R.D. 671 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
138. Since voluntary dismissal without prejudice before defendant answers or serves motion for summary judgment is absolute, Rule 41(a)(1) currently provides the court no discretion
to attach conditions or award attorney's fees upon plaintiff's dimissal, regardless of prejudice
caused by defendant. See Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1976).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
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voluntarily dismiss an action provided no other party will be
harmed. 14 0 Thus, the plaintiff's right to voluntary dismissal is not ab141
solute, but rather is subject to the sound discretion of the court.
The predominant standard governing the federal courts' exercise
of discretion in evaluating a motion for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice is whether the defendant will suffer some plain legal
prejudice. 142 Since this legal standard limits judicial discretion, the
courts freely grant dismissal where legal prejudice is lacking. 14 As a
general rule, the plain legal prejudice standard is concerned only with
the defendant's interests. Thus, the equity of the plaintiff' 44 or the
plaintiff's particular motives 145 in seeking dismissal, the convenience
of the court,' 46 and the public interest in economical administration
of justice 47 are generally immaterial factors in the court's decision to
grant a voluntary dismissal.
The narrow application of the plain legal prejudice standard is
demonstrated by Durham v. FloridaEast Coast Railway. 48 After the
140. LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976). Accord Puerto Rico
Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1981).
141. Alamance Indus. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 142-47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
831 (1961). Accord Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir.
1981); LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976); Home Owners' Loan
Corp. v. Huffman, 134 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1943). The court's decision to grant or deny
plaintiff's motion for dismissal without prejudice is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 605 (5th Cir. 1976). Accord Hamilton v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 1,45 (9th Cir. 1982); Moore v. C.R. Anthony Co., 198 F.2d 607,
608 (10th Cir. 1952).
142. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947). Accord Hamilton
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1982); Kotzen v. Levine, 678 F.2d
140, 141 (11th Cir. 1982); Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 51 (1st
Cir. 1981); Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc., 596 F.2d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1979); Stern v. Barnett, 452
F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1971); Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir.
1967); Alamance Indus. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146-47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 83
(1961); Moore v. C.R. Anthony Co., 198 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1952). Cf. Ferguson v. Eakle, 492
F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing the totality of circumstances in reversing voluntary dismissal);
Noonan v. Cunard S.S., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1967) (weighing factors of consistency in decisions within the same circuit and potential for judge shopping, court ruled that voluntary dismissal to circumvent untimely motion for jury trial was not subject to judicial discretion).
143. See,, e.g., Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir.
1981).
144. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Huffman, 134 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1943). Accord
Spencer v. Moore Business Forms, 87 F.R.D. 118, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
145. See Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc., 596 F.2d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1979); Home Owners' Loan
Corp. v. Huffman, 134 F.2d 314, :318 (8th Cir. 1943); Spencer v. Moore Business Forms, 87
F.R.D. 118, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Kennedy v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 46 F.R.D. 12, 14
(E.D. Ark. 1969).
146. See Alamance Indus. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
83 (1961); Spencer v. Moore Business Forms, 87 F.R.D. 118, 120 & n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
147. See Alamance Indus. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 145-46 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
83 (1961); Spencer v. Moore Business Forms, 87 F.R.D. 118, 120 & n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
148. 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1967).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

19

1984]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 4
RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

district court denied the plaintiff's oral motion to amend his complaint on the day of the trial, the plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal to circumvent the court's order. Sustaining the defendant's
objection to dismissal, the district court noted the case had been
pending trial for a year and was the only one scheduled, the jurors
were selected and ready to proceed, counsel had traveled long distances for the trial, and the plaintiff had given insufficient reason to
dismiss. 149 The court of appeal reversed, ruling that procedural tacti-

cal advantages gained by the plaintiff, 150 the prospect of a second law
suit,151 and waste of judicial resources
were improper considerations
1 52
in determining plain legal prejudice.

As the Durham case illustrates, the federal courts take a circumscribed view of what constitutes legal prejudice. Dismissals have been
upheld where taken to avoid a technical failure of proof; 153 to cure an
untimely motion for jury trial;1 " to circumvent an unfavorable evidentiary ruling; 55 and to obtain the benefits of another forum.15 e
These results arise from a judicial distinction between legal and practical prejudice. 57 Legal prejudice contemplates the loss of a substantive legal defense or vested legal interest in the pending litigation.158
Practical prejudice, on the other hand, involves the more common
burden of delay in the resolution of disputes, increased expense, and
149. Id. at 367.
150. Id. at 368. Federal courts typically refuse to recognize legal prejudice where plaintiffs
seek voluntary dismissal to gain a tactical advantage. See Kotzen v. Levine, 678 F.2d 140, 141
(11th Cir. 1982); Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1981);
Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc., 596 F.2d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1979). Cf. Doyle v. Stanley Works, 60
F.R.D. 132, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (dictum states tactical advantage may not be gained through
voluntary dismissal, but facts indicate plaintiff would suffer legal prejudice being deprived of a
favorable settlement).
151. 385 F.2d at 368. The courts routinely hold that the prospect of defending a second
suit is not by itself legal prejudice. See Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143,
145 (9th Cir. 1982); Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.
1981); Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc., 596 F.2d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1979); LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc.,
528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976).
152. 385 F.2d at 368-69.
153. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947); Kotzen v.
Levine, 678 F.2d 140 (11th Cir. 1982).
154. Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc., 596 F.2d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1979); contra Noonan v. Cunard
S.S. Lines, 375 F.2d 69, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding dismissal without prejudice should not be
allowed to avoid untimely jury demand).
155. See Holiday Queen Land Corp. v. Baker, 489 F.2d 1031, 1032 (5th Cir. 1974).
156. See Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1982);
Clubb v. General Motors Corp., 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1434, 1434 (4th Cir. 1971).
157. See LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603-04 (5th Cir. 1976).
158. See Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1975); Spencer v.
Moore Bus. Forms, 87 F.R.D. 118, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Kennedy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 46 F.R.D. 12 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Southern Md. Agric. Assoc. of Prince George Co. v. United
States, 16 F.R.D. 100, 101 (E.D. Md. 1954).
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other inconvenience caused the defendant. 15 The ability of the court
to award defendant's attorney's fees and impose other curative conditions remedies much of the practical prejudice suffered by defendants. Where no legal prejudice exists, federal courts may grant dismissal even during advanced stages of litigation.6 0
The major shortcoming of the plain legal prejudice standard in
evaluating voluntary dismissal motions is that it is too inflexible to
fully balance the competing interests involved. While a few older district court cases considered the various equities,'16 the current practice clearly favors a narrowly construed legal prejudice standard. By
focusing strictly on the legal prejudice to defendants, many federal
courts have overlooked the public interest in efficient use of judicial
resources and expeditious litigation.'62
C. Imposition of Curative Conditions
Although the legal prejudice standard can be criticized for its failure to balance all relevant interests, judicial discretion to impose
terms and conditions on a plaintiff's dismissal' 63 remedies most
prejudice incurred by defendants. The purpose of the terms and conditions clause of Rule 41(a)(2) is to protect the defendant from any
prejudice or inconvenience resulting from the plaintiff's voluntary
dismissal. 64 Most courts afford the plaintiff the option of accepting
the conditions imposed on dismissal or proceeding with the case. 5
The attorney's fees incurred by a defendant faced with a plaintiff's
motion to dismiss represent the greatest practical prejudice to the
defendant. As a result, the federal courts are becoming increasingly
159. See, e.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976).
160. See Yoffe v. Keller Indus., 582 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915
(1979); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Huffman, 134 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1943).
161. See Note, Voluntary Dismissal by Order of Court - Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(a)(2) and Judicial Discretion, 48 NOTRE DAuS LAW. 446, 450-51 (1972).
162. Two recent cases have cited judicial economy as additional support justifying the
denial or granting of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. See Kennedy v. Nicastro, 94 F.R.D.
30 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (after denying motion for voluntary dismissal of plaintiff's sixth claim on
remand from appeal, court mentioned it would also be a major misuse of judicial time to grant

dismissal); Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. Reactive Metals, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1058 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (in granting plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal, the court noted the alternative
forum in which the plaintiff had refiled action had a lower case backlog and could better apply
applicable laws under conflicts of laws principles).
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
164. Gaf Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1981); accord Yoffe
v. Keller Indus., 582 F.2d 982, 984 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979); LeCompte
v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976).
165. Yoffe v. Keller Indus., 582 F.2d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915
(1979). Cf. Gaf Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding
award of attorney's fees after case had been dismissed, but noting under circumstances that
dismissal was still voluntary).
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generous in their awards. In Yoffe v. Keller 66 the plaintiff filed a federal suit in Florida and then moved to dismiss without prejudice after having joined a related state suit as a party plaintiff. The court,
noting the plaintiff obtained the benefits of discovery in the federal
courts while subjecting defendants to substantial expense and preparation for trial, 67 granted the motion to dismiss and assessed plaintiff over $44,000 in costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees. 68
Upholding the award as within the district court's discretion, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal stated that Rule 41(a)(2) permits dismissal absent legal prejudice, but nevertheless protects the defendant
from other prejudice through the imposition of necessary conditions." 9 A plaintiff who objects to the imposed conditions has the
option of withdrawing its motion to dismiss without prejudice and
proceeding to trial. 70
The prospect of paying exhorbitant attorney's fees as in Yoffe is a
powerful deterrent to precipitous termination of a law suit ripe for
judicial resolution. Plaintiffs considering voluntary dismissal as a tactical manuever must carefully weigh the potential benefits and likelihood of subsequent success against the costs of court imposed conditions and a second suit. Although attorney's fees will not remedy the
emotional and psychological harm a defendant may suffer by preparing for trial and then being suddenly stripped of any accrued advantages, much of the practical burden resulting from voluntary dismissal is eliminated. Despite the protection afforded defendants through
awards of attorney's fees, however, protection of the public interest
in the swift and orderly administration of justice may not be fully
considered. At least one court has ruled that judicial discretion is
limited to imposing conditions that will alleviate only the harm to
defendant.17 1
The federal courts are not limited to awarding attorney's fees
under the terms and conditions clause of Rule 41(a)(2). 7 2 Conditioning voluntary dismissals on production of certain documents or witnesses necessary to defend a second suit is not unusual. 7 3 One recent
166. 582 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979).
167. Id. at 983.
168. Id. See also Gaf Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 96 F.R.D. 188, 191 (D.D.C. 1982)
(awarding $31,503.75 attorney's fees plus $1,579.43 in costs as condition for voluntary dismissal
without prejudice).
169. Yoffe, 582 F.2d at 984.
170. Id.
171. McLaughlin v. Cheshire, 676 F.2d 855, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
172. E.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976).
173. See Eaddy v. Little, 234 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (dismissal conditioned on
plaintiff's production of certain documents); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 32 F.R.D. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (dismissal without prejudice conditioned on plaintiff covenanting not to sue defendants,
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federal court recognized that other conditions can ameliorate waste
of judicial resources, while preventing the defendant from losing the
advantage of favorable legal rulings. In Spencer v. Moore Business
Forms, Inc.,7 4 the plaintiff sought voluntary dismissal without
prejudice after the district court had granted summary judgment in
favor of the corporate defendant. Unhappy with the court's rulings of
law, the plaintiff sought better results by refiling in state court. 17 5
Acknowledging that the plaintiff's motives and the court's convenience are immaterial in properly applying the legal prejudice standard to voluntary dismissal, 17 8 the district court granted the plain-

tiff's motion.177
the defendants
dismissed with
had previously
17 9

The court also took note, however, of the prejudice to
and the waste of judicial resources. 178 Accordingly, it
prejudice all portions of plaintiff's claim in which it
granted summary judgment and taxed costs to the

plaintiff.

The district court's alternative conditions of dismissal in Spencer
represent a desirable approach to resolving the competing interests
affected by voluntary dismissals. Requiring that certain judicial rulings, such as interlocutory orders and evidentiary rulings, be given
binding effect in any subsequent suit permits plaintiffs to take voluntary dismissals for legitimate reasons, while preserving the integrity
of the court and protecting defendants from tactical disadvantages. 80
Thus, in order to insure fairness to all competing interests involved,
where a dismissal with prejudice might have adversely affected plaintiffs related litigation);
Stevenson v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (dismissal conditioned on

plaintiffs making available to defendant at second suit certain records, producing certain witnesses at trial, and paying one-half costs of defendant bringing in other witnesses).
174. 87 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
175. Id. at 123.
176. Id. at 119.
177. Id. at 124.
178. Id. at 123.
179. Id. at 124.
180. This result would be similar to the law of the case doctrine, in which courts place a
self imposed restriction on themselves to preclude re-examination of issues decided on appeal.
See Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 644 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1981); see generally
Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. Rav. 1 (examining the various
ways in which courts have applied the law of the case doctrine and the policies it fulfills). The
Massachusetts Supreme Court has suggested that the law of the case doctrine can also be applied between two different trial courts. See Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 603, 29 N.E.2d
140, 145 (1940). The Supreme Judicial Court stated:
All the judges of the Superior Court have equal powers, and in most matters each is
vested with all the powers of the court ....
A judge should hesitate to undo his own
work ....

Still more should he hesitate to undo the work of another judge ....

But

until the final judgment or decree there is no lack of power, and occasionally the power
may properly be exercised.
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federal courts should follow the Spencer court in expanding the
scope of conditions imposed on plaintiffs taking voluntary dismissals.
IV. NEW YORK - BROADER DISCRETION IN EVALUATING MOTIONS TO

DisMiss
New York Civil Practice Rule 3217181 allows a plaintiff to unilaterally discontinue an action without prejudice only before service of a
responsive pleading or within twenty days of pleading his claim,
whichever occurs first. Any later dismissal is subject to the court's
discretion. 182 In effect, New York has virtually eliminated any abso-

lute right to voluntary dismissal. By eliminating this right the state
avoids the anomalous federal practice of allowing some plaintiffs to
discontinue a lawsuit after the court reaches the merits, simply because an unwary defendant has not formally answered.183
New York courts take a liberal approach to granting discontinuance motions. As a general rule, plaintiffs have a right to dismiss
without prejudice, unless the defendant's substantial rights are
prejudiced or some other injustice will result.184 So long as prejudice
181. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. R. 3217 (McKinney 1970) provides:
Voluntary Discontinuance
(a) Without an order. Any party asserting a claim may discontinue it without an
order
(1) by serving upon all parties to the action a notice of discontinuance at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or within twenty days after service of the
pleading asserting the claim, whichever is earlier, and filing the notice with proof of
service with the clerk of the court; or
(2) by filing with the clerk of the court before the case has been submitted to the
court or jury a stipulation in writing signed by the attorneys of record for all parties,
provided that no party is an infant or incompetent person for whom a committee has
been appointed and no person not a party has an interest in the subject matter of the
action.
(b) By order of court. Except as provided in subdivision (a) an action shall not be
discontinued by a party asserting a claim except upon order of the court and upon terms
and conditions as the court deems proper. After the cause has been submitted to the
court or jury to determine the facts the court may not order an action discontinued
except upon the stipulation of all parties appearing in the action.
(c) Effect of Discontinuance. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, stipulation or
order of discontinuance by means of notice operates as an adjudication on the merits if
the party has once before discontinued by any method an action based on or including
the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States.
Note that New York refers to voluntary dismissal without prejudice as a discontinuance. Id.
182. Id. § 3217(b).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 129-38.
184. Ruderman v. Brunn, 65 A.D.2d 771,409 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding
discontinuance in medical malpractice case to obtain advantage of broader discovery in federal
forum did not prejudice substantial rights of the defendant). Accord Schimansky v. Moduline
Indus., 50 A.D.2d 634, 374 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding plaintiff discontinuance
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is curable by imposition of appropriate conditions, the court will allow a conditional voluntary dismissal.18 5 In this regard the New York
and federal practices are remarkably similar.
The particular standard of prejudice governing the discretion of
New York courts in evaluating voluntary dismissal motions, however,
is less rigid than the federal plain legal prejudice standard. Generally,
voluntary dismissal to escape an impending adverse verdict constitutes legal prejudice; 8 6 the prospect of a mere tactical advantage
does not. 87 New York courts, however, draw the parameters of acceptable tactical advantages more narrowly than the federal courts.
While voluntary dismissal to gain the advantage of broadened pretrial discovery in a federal forum is acceptable, New York' 88 courts
will not permit discontinuance to bypass prior court orders. 89 For
example, in A.B.C. Wholesale Florists,Inc. v. Spanakos,9 0 the court
set aside a discontinuance order in which the plaintiff sought to avoid
denial of his motion to amend the complaint. The court refused to
allow plaintiff to indirectly amend his complaint by refiling suit after
voluntary dismissal. 19' Thus, where some right accrues to defendant
during pendency of litigation, the New York courts are likely to find
the requisite substantial prejudice necessary to deny voluntary dismissal. This approach has the additional advantage of protecting the
integrity of court orders.
Recently, New York courts have shown some willingness to examine plaintiff's interests when evaluating the prejudice to defendant
caused by a voluntary dismissal. In DeMaio v. Coppola e2 the appelso as to refile in federal court where greater recovery for wrongful death action was available
did not prejudice any substantial right of defendant); Cooper v. Cooper, 103 Misc. 2d 689, 430
N.Y.S.2d 998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
185. Cooper v. Cooper, 103 Misc. 2d 689, 694, 430 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
186. Id. Accord Getz v. Harry Silverstein, Inc., 205 Misc. 431, 128 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1954).
187. Ruderman v. Brunn, 65 A.D.2d 771, 771, 409 N.Y.S.2d 789, 789 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978). Accord Cooper v. Cooper, 103 Misc. 2d 689, 694, 430 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
188. See supra note 187.
189. See A.B.C. Wholesale Florists v. Spanakos, 124 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954);
Cooper v. Cooper, 103 Misc. 2d 689, 694, 430 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) and cases
cited therein. The federal courts, however, appear to allow this result. See Durham v. Florida
E. Coast Ry., 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1967) discussed at supra notes 148-52.
190. 124 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
191. Id. at 169. See also Bonafante v. Hadar Homes, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 570, 443 N.Y.S.2d
447 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (New York appellate court ruled plaintiffs could not discontinue
their action on remand after an earlier appeal court reversed an order granting amendment to
the complaint. Such a tactical maneuver would prejudice defendant by depriving him of the law
of the case).
192. 80 A.D.2d 551, 435 N.Y.S.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
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late court affirmed a reluctant trial court's second dismissal without
prejudice so the plaintiff could join a third defendant. 19 s The plaintiff
was a physically deformed infant allegedly injured by wrongfully prescribed drugs ingested by her mother during pregnancy.1 9 4 Balancing
the defendant's substantial rights against any potential injustice to
the infant plaintiff, the court concluded the plaintiff's enormous injuries coupled with complex issues of proof took precedence over immediate disposition, renewed
discovery, and the inconvenience of pro1 95
tracted litigation.
The DeMaio court's willingness to balance the equities of both
parties involved represents a desirable alternative to an inflexible legal prejudice standard. The New York approach, however, shares the
shortcomings of the federal approach in often overlooking the public
interest in efficient administration of justice. This concern was recognized by the dissent in DeLaurentisv. Bercowitz,196 where the majority upheld plaintiff's discontinuance on the eve of trial after plaintiff
had filed the same action in federal court. Despite the majority's remand for determination of appropriate conditions, the dissent objected to delaying resolution of a dispute ready for disposition and
unnecessarily increasing congestion in the federal courts. 97 The dissent concluded such tactical maneuvers defeated the public interest
in efficient administration of justice.19
V. WISCONSIN - AN EMERGING SOLUTION

Wisconsin statute section 805.04199 governing voluntary dismissal
193. Id. at 551, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
194. Id. at 552, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
195. Id.
196. 27 A.D.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
197. Id. at 870, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 729-30.
198. Id. Quoting from Conklin v. Wilbur, 26 A.D. 666, 667, 272 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1966), the dissent concluded: "An efficient court system should not tolerate the casual prosecution of actions and hence, we shall not encourage the use of the discontinuance
device as an adjunct of delay." Id. at 870, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
199. Wis. STAT. § 805.04 (1977) provides:
Voluntary dismissah effect thereof
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court by serving and filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by an
adverse party of a responsive pleading or motion or by the filing of a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in
the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is not on the merits except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when filed by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in sub. (1), an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
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is directly patterned after Federal Rule 41(a). Unlike the Federal
Rule, however, Wisconsin allows the plaintiff an absolute right to vol20 0
untary dismissal only before service of any responsive pleading.
While somewhat less strict than New York in this regard, this approach nevertheless eliminates most
problems arising under the fed20 1
eral rule's more arbitrary cut-off.

Although Wisconsin's statute is analogous to Federal Rule 41(a)
on its face, Wisconsin courts have not adopted the federal courts narrow legal prejudice standard to evaluate voluntary dismissal motions.
Instead, Wisconsin courts have adopted a balancing of equities test
to guide judicial discretion. 0 2 The Wisconsin approach goes beyond
the interest of the immediate parties, however, and acknowledges the
concern raised in the Bercowitz dissent by considering the public interest in efficient use of judicial resources. 0 3
In Monson v. Monson, a Wisconsin appellate court faced with a
motion for voluntary dismissal weighed the equities involved and decided the balance tipped in favor of protecting the public interest in
efficient judicial administration.0 4 Monson involved an action by a
Minnesota resident to enforce arrearages under a Minnesota child
support order against her ex-husband in Wisconsin.0 5 Facing a possible finding of contempt of court for failure to comply with the order, the defendant filed a motion to modify the support order on the
grounds of changed financial circumstances.206 The plaintiff then
sought dismissal without prejudice in order to refile her cause in
Minnesota. Granting the dismissal, the county court ruled Minnesota
would be a more convenient forum.207
under this subsection is not on the merits.
(3) Counterclaim, cross-claim and 3rd party claim. This section applies to the voluntary dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim or 3rd party claim. A voluntary dismissal
by the claimant alone shall be made before a responsive pleading is served, or if there is
none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(4) Costs of previously dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an
action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against
the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the
action previously dismissed as it deems proper and may stay proceedings in the action
until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
200. Id. § 805.04(1).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 129-39.
202. Accord Russell v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 2d 406, 111 N.W.2d 193 (1961). See Dunn v. Fred
A. Mikkelson, Inc., 88 Wis. 2d 369, 276 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. 1979).
203. Monson v. Monson, 85 Wis. 2d 794, 798, 271 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).
Accord Russell v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 2d 406, 413, 111 N.W.2d 193, 196-97 (1961).
204. 85 Wis. 2d 794, 271 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).
205. Id. at 796, 271 N.W.2d at 138.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 797, 271 N.W.2d at 138.
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On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeal reversed and ordered
continuance of the proceedings in Wisconsin courts. 0 8 Reasoning
that the plaintiffs dismissal would create parallel actions, one in Minnesota to recover arrears in the enforcement proceeding and the
other in Wisconsin to eliminate arrears in a modification proceeding,
the court ruled the public interest in efficient judicial administration
required the plaintiff to continue her action in Wisconsin. 20 9 Given
the public interest and the defendant's right to a judicial determination of his motion for modification, any inconvenience to the plaintiff
was insufficient to grant her motion for dismissal.2 1
Whether Wisconsin will continue to consider the public interest in
efficient use of judicial resources beyond matrimonial disputes is uncertain. Other states,21 1 including Florida, 1 2 have been more willing
to consider the public interest in the marital context. Wisconsin
seems likely, however, to continue the trend in this direction. Unlike
other matrimonial dispute cases, the Monson court focused on the
efficient use of judicial resources, rather than the more narrow but
equally important public interest in the child's welfare. Therefore,
the Monson rationale should be equally applicable in 'other contexts.
The relative importance of the public interest in the balancing
process required to evaluate dismissal motions is indicated to some
extent in Dunn v. Fred A. Mikkelson, Inc.2 15 In Dunn the Wisconsin
Supreme Court established factors for trial courts to consider in evaluating dismissal motions. Those factors include the utility of work
performed for future proceedings should plaintiff reinstate the action; the plaintiff's good faith in seeking dismissal; the stage of the
proceeding; the complexity of the work performed; any undue hardship to the plaintiff; and any unique prejudice to the defendant.2 1 At
least two factors listed, the utility of work performed for future proceedings and the stage to which the proceedings have progressed, encompass the public interest in the efficient administration of justice.
Thus, in view of both the Monson and Dunn decisions, it appears an
emerging solution is developing in Wisconsin that creates a balance
most fair to the parties involved, while preserving the public interest
208. Id. at 804, 271 N.W.2d at 141, 142.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 55 A.D.2d 817, 390 N.Y.S.2d 607 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976); Harmon v. Harmon, 257 S.C. 141, 184 S.E.2d 553 (1971).
212. See Chapnick v. Hare, 394 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (citing public interest in
welfare of children, court refused to allow voluntary dismissal to divest it of jurisdiction to
enforce custody order).
213. 88 Wis. 2d 369, 276 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. 1979).
214. Id. at 382, 276 N.W.2d at 754.
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in the integrity and efficiency of the judicial system.
VI. CONCLUSION

Florida's absolute right to voluntary dismissal provides plaintiffs
with a procedural device to circumvent unfavorable rulings or escape
an impending adverse verdict. Strategic manipulation of this procedural device can block action favorable to defendants, in effect giving
plaintiffs a second day in court to litigate issues already decided.2 18
Arbitrary dismissals during late stages of the proceedings cause needless delay further prejudicing defendants who have expended considerable time, effort and expense preparing their cases. Moreover, while
voluntary dismissal itse]f is often an abusive litigation tactic, Florida
law also permits voluntary dismissals to escape sanctions for other
forms of abusive litigation.21 6 The Florida Legislature 211 and Supreme
Court 18 have failed to develop adequate safeguards to protect defendants from undue prejudice, to preserve judicial integrity, and to prevent waste of judicial resources caused by duplicative litigation.
The experience in the federal courts with dismissals taken after
judicial hearings reaching the merits illustrates the desirability of
leaving voluntary dismissal to the complete discretion of the
courts.2 1 9 The New York rule providing a maximum twenty day period for automatic discontinuances is one alternative.22 0 The Wisconsin rule terminating plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss without
prejudice after any responsive pleading is another possible alternative.22 1 Both rules allow courts to prevent arbitrary dismissals after
defendants have expended considerable resources defending pretrial
motions. Additionally, providing courts with discretion to rule on voluntary dismissal motions will prevent plaintiffs from manipulating
the procedure to avoid sanctions for abusive litigation.
The more difficult problem for other jurisdictions has been developing a proper standard to follow in evaluating voluntary dismissal
215. See supra text accompanying notes 45-70.
216. In particular, a plaintiff can dismiss his suit to avoid sanctions for failure to prosecute and abuse of discovery, then refile the same claim the next day. See supra text accompanying notes 76-90.
217. Since provision for attorney's fees is a matter of substantive law in Florida, the legislature has sole authority to determine whether the courts can award such fees as sanctions for
voluntary dismissal. Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982).
218. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1968) provides that the practice and procedure of the courts
shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 129-39.
220. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3217 (McKinney 1970). For the text of the rule, see supra
note 181.
221. See Wis. STAT. § 805.04 (1977). That section is quoted at supra note 199.
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motions. The plain legal prejudice standard 222 has often been too inflexible to properly consider the defendant's interests and prevent
waste of judicial resources. New York's less rigid prejudice standard 223 better protects defendants and the integrity of judicial rulings
by preventing plaintiffs from discontinuing actions simply to bypass
prior court orders. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of these standards, the discretion to award attorney's fees as a condition of voluntary dismissal protects defendant's economic interests and forces
those plaintiffs considering voluntary dismissal as a tactical maneuver to carefully consider the costs of their actions.224
The recent approach of the Wisconsin courts appears to be the
most desirable alternative because it considers all the competing interests involved. A balancing of equities standard allows courts to determine what is most fair to the litigants, while protecting the public'
interest in the integrity and efficiency of the judicial system. When
.courts do grant voluntary dismissal motions, appropriate conditions
should be attached. In addition to attorney's fees, courts should be
encouraged to impose alternative conditions 225 that will protect defendants and prevent wasteful duplication in subsequent
proceedings.
Florida has expanded the right to voluntary dismissal without
prejudice during an era in which most jurisdictions have restricted
the right to curb its abuse. The original justifications for liberal dismissal rules no longer exist given the move to notice pleadings and
technical advancements in communication and transportation.220 Action by the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to its rule making authority is long overdue. At a minimum legislation authorizing awards
of attorney's fees to defendants is necessary to prevent excessive manipulation of Florida's voluntary dismissal rule as an abusive litigation tactic.
JEFFREY

C. REGAN

222. See supra text accompanying notes 142-62.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 183-214.

225.

Spencer v. Moore Bus. Forms, 87 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ga. 1980). For a discussion of

Spencer and imposition of alternative conditions, see supra notes 172-80.
226. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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